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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID BURT,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

:

Case No. 890190CA

:

BETTY MAE BURT,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority: 14b

:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Appellant's basic claim on appeal is that the Trial Court
did not properly divide the marital property of the parties and in
particular, gave the Respondent an interest in her earnings on
inherited funds.

The Trial Court had broad equitable discretion

in domestic relations matters and such equitable awards as were
made in this case should not be overturned on appeal unless the
Court acted arbitrarily or capriciously or where it is apparent by
a proponderance that the Trial Court misapplied the law or the
facts in determining a division of the property.
A thorough reading of the facts presented at the Trial support
the

Trial

Court's

conclusion

and

demonstrates

that

the

Court

attempted to equalize the parties after a forty (40) year marriage
as much as possible.

The Trial Court had both evidentiary and

legal support for its decision and there is no evidence which
clearly preponderates against a Trial Court decision and therefore,
this Court should not substitute its Judgment for that of the Trial
Court.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID BURT,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 890190CA

vs,
Priority: 14b

BETTY MAE BURT,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Respondent

has

no

quarrel

with

Appellant's

Statement

of

Jurisdiction and the matter is properly before this Court pursuant
to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Respondent has no quarrel with Appellant's recitation of the
Nature of Proceedings.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
The gravamen of all the issues raised by the Appellant in this
appeal can be reduced to one fairly simple issue and that is,
whether or not the Trial Court Judge abused his discretion in
making certain financial awards to the parties.
The Appellant has chosen to address a variety of issues, but
in the pure sense, the only

issue that existed between

these

parties at the time of the divorce, was a division of the marital
property and a provision for the payment of debts and for the
ongoing support of each party.

These financial decisions were made by the Court following a
full hearing

and the only

issue properly before the Court

is

whether or not the Judge, who has great equitable latitude in these
matters, abused that discretion.
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The Appellant filed a Divorce Complaint as the Plaintiff on
April 24, 1987 and three (3) days thereafter, the Respondent filed
a Divorce Complaint as Plaintiff.

Two (2) cases were consolidated

with the Appellant being listed as the Defendant and Respondent as
the Plaintiff.

(See Tp. 1-8)

Thereafter, temporary Orders, based upon an Order To Show
Cause were filed in the case and a Pretrial Settlement Conference
was

held

between

the

parties

Commissioner, Maurice Richards.

before

the

Domestic

Relations

The matter was heard on June 24,

1988, at which time Financial Declarations were being submitted,
Proposed Settlements and testimony was taken and the Commissioner,
issued a Recommended Order to the Court included
ruling that the increase of the Defendant's

inter alia a

inheritance was a

marital asset and therefore, was subject to an equitable division
of marital property in the proceedings and that the home purchased
by the Defendant using those proceeds was also therefore, a marital
asset.

(See Recommended Order of Commissioner. Volume 1 Record on

Appeal)
The Appellant objected to that recommendation and the case was
set for Trial on January 20, 1989.

At the Trial both parties

testified, exhibits were reviewed and the Court issued a Memorandum
2

Decision

on

February

8,

1989,

upon

which

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were submitted, which were
ultimately signed by the Judge on March 2, 1989.

The

Appellant

filed her Notice of Appeal on the 28th day of March, 1989 to this
Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Respondent has reviewed Appellant's Statement of the Facts
on Page 4, 5 and 6 of Appellant's Brief.

This does not give a

complete factual picture that was presented to the Court, both at
the time of the hearing before the Domestic Relations Commissioner
and the hearing before the Trial Judge that are critical to a
determination of this appeal.

Therefore, Respondent will submit

his own Statement.
Appellant and Respondent were married on the 5th day of March,
1947 in Idaho Falls, Idaho.

At the time of their divorce they had

been married approximately 42 years.

(See Tp. 1)

The parties bed

two (2) children born as issue of their marriage, both of whom had
reached the age of majority by the time of Trial.
In the early part of the parties marriage, from approximately
1947 until the early 1960 ! s, the Respondent was the primary income
producer of the parties.

(See Tp. 89)

He was employed by the

Federal Government and also maintained a part-time, in the home,
watch repair business.

(See Tp. 60)

During this period of time

the Appellant did not work, but spent her primary time with the
children

in

raising

them.

The

Respondent

however,

paid

the

mortgage payment on the home and all of the household expenses.
3

(See Tp. 92)
Beginning in the early 1960 f s, as the children reached teenage
years, the Appellant began work at Whitehead Electric Company in
Ogden,

first

on

a part-time

basis, working

into

a

full-time

position by the late 1960 f s, a position which she held until her
retirement in 1987.

During this time Appellant made approximately

the same amount of money as the Respondent.
1976

Respondent retired in

(Tp. 60) and began receiving his retirement on a monthly

basis.
During this period of time, in approximately 1969 and 1972,
at the time of the death of Appellant's parents, she received an
inheritance

from

them

in the sum of

$71,600.

Appellant

then

proceeded over the next fifteen (15) years to invest that money in
stocks,

bonds,

CD f s

and

other

investment

devises, while

the

Respondent continued to work and pay the monthly mortgage payment
on the home and the basic household expenses.

(See Tp. 178)

Essentially, the Appellant was allowed to take her money and
use it for her own purposes.

In most cases, buying expensive curio

type items and indulging in her own private acquisition program.
The

Respondent

necessities

for

however,
the

continued

parties.

to

Although

provide
during

for
this

the

basic

time

the

Appellant did make some improvements on the home, this was really
her only contribution to the day to day living expenses of the
parties.
The Judge summed it up best in his Memorandum Decision when
he indicated

that

"the marital

arrangement of the parties was
4

unique in that it created a situation of "what was hers was hers
and what was his was theirs11".

(See Page 2 of the Memorandum

Decision)
By the time of the divorce the Respondent was receiving the
sum of $1350 per month from his Federal Retirement.
Court

found

approximately

that

he

had

an

additional

$616, this was primarily

Although the

monthly

income

of

from the rental of his

mother ! s home, which had been given to he and his brother and a
small amount of money from his watch business.

The income from the

Respondent's watch business had steadily deteriorated to the time
of Trial, primarily because all Respondent's equipment was aged and
his business was geared to fixing mechanical watches, rather than
the quartz watches which now form the bulk of the watch sales.
(See Tp. 61-73)
The

Appellant

inheritance

in

to

on
a

the
small

other

hand,

fortune, the

parlayed
sum

of

her

$71,000

approximately

$195,340, while the Appellant continued to provide for she and the
family.

Appellant used this money to purchase a new home and kept

the balance in a variety of investment accounts by the time of the
divorce.
The Appellant also retired from her work at Whitehead Electric
and although she was not receiving retirement income, received $415
from

Social

Security,

$515

from

interest

in dividends

on her

remaining funds and $185 from an IRA for a total monthly income of
$1,115 at the time of the divorce.

(See Tp. Ill)

At the time of the divorce, the Respondent was living in the
5

parties

home.

The Appellant was

living

in the home

she

had

purchased from her invested funds. Neither party was working.

The

Respondent had very little income from his watch business, both
essentially were retired, living on the incomes that they had each
made, either through retirement or investments, were living in
separate residences and each maintaining separate property.
The Court was then called upon to divide the property and make
appropriate financial arrangements between the parties, which it
did following a complete hearing on the matter where both parties
testified, numerous documents were received and the Court was fully
advised as to their financial status.
The Court took the matter under advisement for a period of
approximately two (2) weeks, issued a Memorandum Decision, making
and equitable division of the property as set forth therein and
from that decision, the Appellant appealed, primarily on the basis
that she did not receive more property in the division made by the
Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION AND IN FACT, ADDRESSED
THE ISSUE OF THE RESPONDENT'S
RETIREMENT IN MAKING ITS UTLIMATE
PROPERTY DISPOSITION
Appellant

complains

in

her

first

attack

on

the

Court ! s

finding, as she does throughout, that the Court in effect, failed
to give her equitable treatment in the divorce and did not consider
the Respondent's retirement in light of Woodward v. Woodward case,
6

656 P.2d 431 (1982).
Unfortunately, Appellant1s position is both unsupported by
the facts of the case and her reliance upon Woodward v. Woodward
is misplaced.
There was ample testimony from the Trial indicating that by
the time these parties filed for divorce, they had both retired,
thus the Respondent's retirement had in fact, vested.

It was

paying him, at the time of the divorce, the sum of approximately
$1300 per month, so this is not a question of deferred compensation
or a wife taking a portion of retirement proceeds to be paid in the
future.
It

is

clear

from

the

Court's

findings

that

bulk

of

Respondent's income, upon which he now lives, is his retirement.
He does in fact, have a small income from a rental property and a
very small income from watch repair, which is diminishing.

In any

event, the Court considered that income in determining that there
was a disparity in property and income and in order to equalize
those disparities that the Court found, based upon the values of
the properties that the Appellant received in the divorce and had
already taken, and after considering those things, awarded the
Appellant permanent alimony in the sum of $3 00 per month.
Court's method

of

equalizing

both

property

and

Thus the

income,

after

considering all the factors, was to award the Appellant alimony,
even though she is basically self-supporting with an income of
$1115 per month.
It is important to note the exact language of the Woodward
7

case.

The Court is directed to Justice Durham's specific comments

on Page 432 in speaking of retirement benefits, Justice Durham
states:
"If the rights to those benefits are acquired
during the marriage, then the Court must at
least consider those benefits in making an
equitable division of the marital assets."
In other words, while the Trial Court in Woodward utilized a
formula, which the Supreme Court found acceptable, the basic ruling
of the case is simply that retirement is a marital asset and must
be considered by the Court in making an equitable distribution.
In

this

case

the

Trial

Court

clearly

considered

Respondent's

retirement income in making its equitable distribution and found,
based upon a totality of the circumstances, that portion of the
Respondent's retirement which should be awarded to the Appellant
was in fact, the $3 00 a month alimony award.
In

addition,

the Appellant

seems

to

dove-tail

argument into the argument of the survivor annuity.

this

same

It has never

been held by this Court that a survivor annuity in the form of an
insurance policy is a property right which must be awarded, in some
percentage, to a spouse in a divorce proceeding.

The survivor

annuity in this case is simply an insurance policy that if the
Respondent were to die, his designated survivor would receive an
annuity in the form of a portion of his retirement.

This normally

is any individual whom the owner of the annuity would designate.
Even if the Appellant can somehow bootstrap this argument in to the
Woodward formula, the Woodward case only requires that the Court

8

consider these benefits in making an equitable distribution.
The

Court

heard

evidence

about

the

annuity,

about

the

retirement and after looking at the totality of the circumstances,
as a matter of equity, made the alimony

award which

is fully

supportable by the facts and therefore, Appellant's argument has
no merit whatsoever.
POINT 11
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN AWARDING THE SUM OF $3 00 PER MONTH, AS AND
FOR ALIMONY
This argument is essentially the same as those addressed in
Argument Point One above.
seems

to

interpret

The Appellant in her misguided greed,

Supreme

Court

decisions

as

somehow equalizing income means a 50-50 treatment.
has said that.

requiring

that

Again, no Court

This Court has constantly held in a variety of

cases, including Stone v. Stone, 19 U.2d 378 (1967) and Harding v.
Harding 488 P.2d 308 (1971), that divorce is an equity proceeding
and the Trial Court should, as much as humanly possible, given the
facts, attempt to achieve equity.
The Court knowing that the Respondent had a guaranteed income
from retirement of approximately $1300 and additional income of
approximately $600, which was not guaranteed, in the form of rents
which may or may not continue and the form of watch repair which
had diminished substantially, took into consideration those factors
and the Appellant!s $1100 income and awarded $300, which brought
the

incomes to approximately

$1400 and

certainly an equitable division of income.
9

$1600 respectively,

or

The Court also took in to consideration the fact that in the
overall

award of the personal and real property

the Appellant

received $28,987 of value in excess of Respondent and attempted to
utilize

the

alimony

property award.

provision

to

equalize

that

excess

in the

All of this is appropriate and required in divorce

proceedings.
In

Watson

v.

Watson,

561

P. 2d

1072

(Utah

1977)

Justice

Crockett made the observation:
f,

it is further pertinent to observe that a
divorce proceeding, is sometimes said to be
equitable in the highest degree and that again,
a Trial Court is to do equity.11
Judge Taylor in this case did equity.
The problem is that the Appellant has never understood the
term equity throughout her marriage as is evidenced by her own
Trial Court testimony.
Trial

Transcript,

when

The Court is directed to Page 214 of the
under

cross-examination

the

Appellant

acknowledged that from 1960 until 1987 she was on a joint bank
account with the Respondent at Commercial Security Bank where she
could draw checks and in fact, drew checks, but her husband, in an
inequitable fashion, was not allowed the same access to her own
account.
On Page 219 and 220 of the Trial Transcript, when discussing
her own finances, Appellant tells us that all of her money was
placed in her account and that Respondent's name was not on that
account and finally, culminating on Page 221, during the entire
time of 1968 through 1984, when the Appellant was investing her

10

insurance money (the subject of a later argument in this Brief),
that the Respondent was paying out of his money, all the day to day
household expenses, and when asked about when she deposited any of
her money into his account, she attempted to find that, but could
not.

Appellant dmitted on Page 222 that it would probably be less

than $1000 from 1960 until 1987.
In effect, Appellant's own testimony reveals her complete
misunderstanding

of the concept

of equity

and

so, when

Judge

Taylor, through his decision, attempted to interject equity into
what has been, by his own comments,

,f

a rather unique marital

situation", it is only natural I suppose for the Appellant to react
the

way

she

has.

Unfortunately,

Appellant's

knee

jerk

type

reaction should not be condoned or supported by this Court.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ALLOWING THE RESPONDENT AN INTEREST IN THE
APPELLANT'S GAINS ON HER INHERITED PROPERTY
This

argument

is

in

reality,

the

focal

point

of

the

Appellant's complaint in this case.

It goes without saying that

in

received

1968

and

1972,

the

Appellant

some

$71,000

in

inheritance money from her parents' estate, which she then, over
a period

of

sixteen

(16) years, parlayed

in to

approximately

$180,000, from which she purchased a new home, many expensive curio
items and essentially was allowed to live a life free from any
financial responsibility to the home, because the husband in this
case, was paying all the basic marital debts.
In the arguments of counsel, following the Trial, the Court
11

reviewed the cases of Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, (Utah
1987),

Preston

v.

Preston,

646

P.2d

Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 P.2d 204

705

(Utah

1982),

(Utah 1988).

and

There is no

question that the status of the law in Utah at this time is that
inherited property which is received by either party to a marriage,
is separate from the marital estate and must either be credited or
deducted

in

an

overall

division

of

the

estate

in

a

divorce

proceeding.
It is interesting to note, however, that even in these most
recent inheritance decisions, the Court is still looking at one
underlying fact, as set forth coherently by Justice Zimmerman in
the Newmeyer case, referring to the Preston case and others, he
says this:
"The overriding consideration is that the
ultimate division be equitable - that property
be fairly divided between the parties given
their contributions during the marriage and
their circumstances at the time of the
divorce.11
(Id at 1278)
The Court had all of these facts before it.

The fact that for

a period of time, from 194 7 when the parties were married, until
1987,

a

period

of

some

forty

(40)

years

when

the

divorce

proceedings were initiated, the Respondent worked a full-time job
until his retirement in 1976.

During this time the parties raised

two (2) children. All the Respondent's income was directed towards
paying the mortgage on the home, the basic living expenses of the
parties and at least until the mid-60 ! s, providing the sole support
for the Appellant and her children.
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While it is true that the Appellant then went to work at
Whitehead

Electric, first on a part-time and then a full-time

basis, the Appellant was left free to use her money for whatever
she wanted, collecting curio 1 s, going to lunch, going on trips or
investing in stocks and bonds.

She was allowed to do this under

her separate, but equal theory, wherein she had full access to the
Respondent's income, a roof over her head and food on the table,
but he had no access to her income and in fact, was kept away under
the theory that what was hers was hers and what was his was also
hers.
The

Court

further

determined

contrary

to

some

cases,

particularly Mortenson, where this Court has indicated that if the
inherited money essentially stayed in the same form, although it
may increase, it should not be considered part of the marital
estate, that the Appellant!s money did not stay in the same form.
She invested it in stocks, bonds and other investment vehicles and
in fact, parlayed her initial $70,000 investment 2 1/2 times over
a period of fourteen (14) years during which, by her own admission,
she may have paid $1000 towards the family expenses.

She was able,

at the time of the divorce and following her retirement, to have
amassed assets in the sum of $195,340.

This included a new home

which she purchased in the Roy area of Weber County, collectibles,
cars, CD accounts and other valuable property.
The Respondent on the other hand, had amassed savings of only
$28,000 and personal property in the sum of approximately $8644.
The family home (upon which Respondent paid the mortgage for the
13

entirety of the marriage) was valued at $65,000 and so it could be
said, was Respondent's primary investment.
to $102,153-

These amounts totalled

In essence then, the Appellant had twice as much

money and property in liquid funds at the end of a forty (40) year
marriage.
All the Court did, as it is required to do in the previously
cited cases of Watson, Stone, Preston, Mortenson and Newmeyer, is
to make an equitable division of that financial situation.
Court

followed

the

cases

explicitly,

gave

each

party

The
their

inheritance, $7 4 00 to the Respondent, which represented the amount
of the residence received

from his mother and the $71,000, the

amount Appellant received

from her parents.

disparity

between

these

parties

of

$28,987

This still left a
in

favor

of

the

arguments,

she

Appellant.
In

the

Appellant!s

Brief,

under

separate

indicates that the boat, Toyota truck and snowmobile were sold and
it is not apparent where that money is and other monies, when the
Court

in

fact, did

consider

these matters

in determining

the

overall valuation, gave the Respondent credit for all these as
having received them and added them in to the overall totals.
Therefore, in essence, alL the money, all the value, all the costs,
sales and property was on the table and there was still a disparity
even after deducting the inheritances of $28,000.

The Court then

equalized this disparity through the alimony award as previously
discussed.
The Trial Court in making a determination that the Respondent
14

had an interest in the increase on Appellant!s inherited money was
totally consistent with this Court's prior decisions.
did not reside in the same form.

The money

The money was invested in to a

variety of investment vehicles and at the same time the Appellant
was investing merrily on her way, the Respondent was paying the
family debts and obligations and maintaining both these parties in
the family home.
What the Court's decision effectively does, is gave both of
these parties a home, free and clear, gave them personal property
which each wanted, either by stipulation or by award and equalized
their post-divorce incomes to the point that both can live very
comfortably.

What could be more equitable or in keeping

the

Supreme Court decisions than that type of decision.
The problem here is that the Appellant, as she did throughout
her marriage, took the position in the divorce proceedings that not
only

should

she have a comfortable

home to

live

in, all

the

personal property she acquired, but in effect, have half the home
that

both

of

these

parties

had

resided

in, thus

forcing

the

Respondent to either liquidate or encumber his property and to take
a higher portion of his retirement income, so that in effect, the
Respondent would either not have a home or have a home encumbered
and would not have sufficient income to take care of himself in the
later years of his life.
Of course the Appellant does not see these things.

She only

sees the fact that she was able to acquire approximately $200,000
in property and then again, what was hers was hers and what was
15

his, because of a forty (40) year marriage, was also one-half hers.
Judge Taylor simply would not abide that convoluted thinking and
made his decision accordingly.
POINT IV
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE REFERENCED
ARGUMENTS, THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED
TO SHOW IN ANY OF HER ARGUMENTS THAT
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION OR
THAT THIS COURT SHOULD SUBSTITUTE ITS
JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT
There
decisions

is

no

than

clearer

that

of

mandate

giving

by

great

this

Court

credence

to

in

numerous

Trial

Court

decisions in domestic relations matters.
The cases are replete with statements of this Court concerning
the

standard

to be applied when

reviewing

property

and

other

financial decisions in a domestic relations case.
Citing first from Stone v. Stone as referenced above, in 1967
Justice Crockett said:
In reviewing the Trial Court's Order in divorce
proceedings, there are certain well established
principles to be borne in mind. The Findings
and Order are endowed with a presumption of
validity and the burden is on the Appellant to
show they are in error.
Even though our
Constitutional Provision, Section 9 of Article
8, states that in equity cases this Court may
review the facts, we nevertheless take into
account the advantaged position of the Trial
Judge. Accordingly we recognize that it is his
prerogative to judge the credibility of the
witnesses and in case of conflict, we assume
that the Trial Court believed the evidence
which supports the Findings.
We review the
whole evidence in the light most favorable to
them and we will not disturb them merely
because this Court might have viewed the matter
differently, but only if the evidence clearly
preponderates against the Findings.
(Id at
803)
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This clear expression of the Court ! s view in these cases has
been followed consistently in Watson, Woodward, Preston, Newmeyer
and Mortenson cited above.

This Court is required to review the

findings of the Trial Court below with an eye towards sustaining
them, if the Court did not abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily
or capriciously and unless the Appellant, upon whose shoulders the
burden rests, demonstrates that the evidence clearly preponderates
against the Court's findings.

The Appellant has failed miserably

in meeting this standard.
It is interesting to note that under the new Utah Statute
allowing

for

Domestic

Relations

Commissioners

this

case

has

actually been presented twice to two (2) different finders of fact.
The

Domestic

original

Relations

ruling

Commissioner, Maurice

after reviewing

Richards,

in his

the Affidavits, pleadings

and

hearing some testimony of the parties, determined the key issue
that the Respondent was entitled to an interest in the Appellant!s
increase on her inherited income and that basically the parties
should be put in a position that each had the same amount of assets
after a forty (40) year marriage.
Judge Taylor, although hearing more evidence and making a more
specific decision, did not deviate from the Commissioner's original
ruling.

Therefore, two (2) finders of fact at two (2) different

levels in the Trial Court system found in favor of the Respondent
on the key issues.

This fact alone preponderates in favor of

sustaining the decision that Judge Taylor made.
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This Court can review a myriad of domestic relations cases and
in every one, the Courts come down with a view towards equity,
placing the parties in a reasonable financial position following
the divorce, allowing for the totality of the circumstances and
fundamental fairness as a Court of equity.

Judge Taylor's decision

meets all of these important tests.
This Court is directed to the excellent analysis of Justice
Zimmerman in the Newmeyer case, a more recent decision which in
effect,

simply

restates

Justice

Crockett's

1971

opinion.

In

referring to the arguments of the Appellant in that case, in which
the arguments were made that the Supreme Court in effect should
review certain financial awards made and make different rulings,
Justice Zimmerman said this:
"This argument, like the that proceeded it, is
nothing but an attempt to have this Court
substitute its judgment for that of the Trial
Court on a contested factual issue. This we
can not do under Utah Rules of Procedure 52A. . .
It is elementary that a Judge is not bound to
believe one (1) witness testimony to a total
exclusion of that of another when acting of the
trier of fact, the Trial Judge is entitled to
give a conflicting opinion to whatever weight
he/she deems appropriate."
This Court on review, should not substitute its Judgment for
that of the finder of fact, unless it is apparent that the finder
of fact abused its discretion by either not following the law or
making an interpretation of fact that is simply not supported.
During the course of a full day Trial, the Court heard six (6)
witnesses, examined in excess of twenty (20) exhibits and heard the
arguments of counsel.

Following that, the Court took the matter
18

under advisement and rendered a succinct decision which considered
all the facts presented in the case.
This is a case where the Appellant does not agree with the
decision because it attempts to equalize her financial position
without that of her husband, smoething she has fought against since
the late 1950's, when by her own testimony, she believed that it
was necessary for her to maintain a separate financial existence
from that of her husband.
Fortunately, this was not a separate but equal situation, but
became a separate and unequal situation for a period of thirty (30)
years and the Trial Court refused to allow the practice to continue
in the future.

The Appellant now should not be allowed to benefit

with that convoluted type of approach to a marriage.
The Court should also take note that at the very end, the
Appellant even objects to her having to pay her own attorney's fees
in what seems to be the ultimate manifestation of the Appellant's
greed.

In a case where whether inherited or not, she has assets

which exceed those of the Respondent, and when she continues to
drag this matter through the Courts following constant adverse
rulings against her position, Appellant now asks not only for a
reversal of the attorney's fee award in the lower Court, but for
attorney's fees for this proceeding.
This Court should not reward that type of financial lust.
These parties entered into a marriage covenant in 1947 which ended
in a Courtroom on January 20, 1989. Unfortunately, human relations
being what they are, we can not always predict what the future will
19

hold when as young people, a man and a woman, move down the road
of life.
The Trial Court in a domestic proceeding can not give back the
people's

lives

preconceived

in

this

ideas

or

case,

living

nor

can

habits.

they
What

alter
the

concepts,

Court

can

do

however, and did in this case, is to take the parties as it found
them and that was in an inequitable position at the time of the
termination of the marriage and attempt to equalize that position
and restore some dignity, in this case, to the Respondent.
The Appellant

has

now

continued

her

crusade

to have her

"peculiar" point of view adopted by a higher Court.

No trier of

fact adopted it and this Court should say once and for all to the
Appellant, enough, go your way, live your life in whatever manner
you choose, but the marriage is over, the property is divided and
the matter is ended.
To do anything different would be to condone, even to a small
decree, the conduct which Appellant demonstrated throughout the
majority

of the years of the marriage, which was to create a

financial cushion for herself at the expense of her spouse and
then, to ask this Court to place her spouses hecid on it by further
depleting his assets.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant has raised numerous issues wherein she takes
issue with the lower Court's findings.

In every instance the lower

Court

presented

considered

all

the

evidence

by

both

sides.

Evidence was presented in two (2) separate hearings wherein both
20

the

Domestic

Relations

Commissioner

similar rulings on the key issues.

and

the

Trial

Court

made

Notwithstanding many separate

individual findings, the gravamen of this case is whether or not
the financial award in all aspects, including property division and
spousal support was equitable.

It was equitable in this case and

it is supported by the evidence presented.

The Trial Court has

ample support, both factually and legally, for his decision and the
Appellant has failed in all respects, to demonstrate that the award
was based upon an inappropriate or inaccurate application of the
law, an improper finding of fact and Appellant has not shown by a
preponderance that any decision of the Court should be overturned
by this Court given the overriding considerations and guidelines
utilized by this Court in domestic cases.
This Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the
Trial Court and the Trial Court!s ruling in its entirety should be
sustained.

/

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

I

day of January, 199 0.

/ j d H N H t ^ CAINS' l ^
^
/ Attoimey for Respondent
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